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Abstract
Most traditional models of uncertainty have
focused on the associational relationship
among variables as captured by conditional
dependence. In order to successfully man-
age intelligent systems for decision making,
however, we must be able to predict the ef-
fects of actions. In this paper, we attempt to
unite two branches of research that address
such predictions: causal modeling and deci-
sion analysis. First, we provide a definition of
causal dependence in decision-analytic terms,
which we derive from consequences of causal
dependence cited in the literature. Using
this definition, we show how causal depen-
dence can be represented within an influence
diagram. In particular, we identify two in-
adequacies of an ordinary influence diagram
as a representation for cause. We introduce
a special class of influence diagrams, called
causal influence diagrams, which corrects one
of these problems, and identify situations
where the other inadequacy can be elimi-
nated. In addition, we describe the relation-
ships between Howard Canonical Form and
existing graphical representations of cause.
1 Introduction
Most traditional models of uncertainty, including
Markov networks [Lauritzen, 1982] and belief networks
[Pearl, 1988] have focused on the associational rela-
tionship among variables as captured by conditional
independence and dependence. Associational knowl-
edge, however, is not sufficient when we want to make
decisions under uncertainty. For example, although we
know that smoking and lung cancer are probabilisti-
cally dependent, we cannot conclude from this knowl-
edge that we will increase our chances of getting lung
cancer if we start smoking. In general, to make ratio-
nal decisions, we need to be able to predict the effects
of our actions.
Recent work by Artificial Intelligence researchers,
statisticians, and philosophers—for example, Pearl
and Verma (1991), Druzdzel and Simon (1993), and
Spirtes et al. (1993)—have emphasized the impor-
tance of identifying causal relationships for purposes
of modeling the effects of intervention. They argue,
for example, that if we believe that smoking causes
lung cancer, then we know that if we start to smoke
then we will increase our chances of getting lung can-
cer. In contrast, if we believe that there is a gene that
causes both lung cancer and our desire to smoke, then
we know that if we start to smoke then we will not
increase our chances of getting lung cancer.
For over a decade, decision analysts have used the
influence diagram to represent decisions problems
[Howard and Matheson, 1981]. In doing so, they have
worried about representing the effects of interventions
(decisions) on a set of uncertain variables. Nonethe-
less, they have avoided using notions of causality in
their work, in large part because no precise definition
of causality has been proposed.
In this paper, we attempt to weave together these two
threads of research. In particular, we propose a defi-
nition of causal dependence in clear decision-analytic
terms, which we derive from consequences of such de-
pendence often cited in the causal modeling litera-
ture. We thereby offer a means by which the results in
each discipline may be translated to the other. Thus,
for example, decision analysts may translate Pearl’s
(1994) calculus of intervention to a method for proving
stochastic dominance. Conversely, researchers work-
ing on causal modeling can use influence diagrams
in Howard Canonical Form for planning under uncer-
tainty.
Given the audience of this paper, we concentrate
mostly on translating results from decision analysis
to the representation and manipulation of causal de-
pendence. After defining causal dependence, we show
how it can be represented within an influence diagram.
We identify two inadequacies of the influence diagram
as a representation for cause, and introduce a special
class of influence diagrams, called causal influence di-
agrams, which corrects one of these problems. In ad-
dition, we identify situations where the other inade-
quacy can be eliminated. Also, we show how influence
diagrams in Howard Canonical Form may be used to
answer counterfactual queries. Finally, we show the re-
lationship between Howard Canonical Form and Pearl
and Verma’s (1991) causal theory.
2 Background
Fundamental to our discussion is the distinction be-
tween a chance variable and a decision variable. In
general, a variable has a (possibly infinite) set of mu-
tually exclusive and collectively exhaustive possible
states. The state of a decision variable is chosen by
a person, usually called the decision maker. In con-
trast, a chance variable is uncertain and its state may
be at most indirectly affected by the decision maker’s
choices. For example, the decision to smoke or not is
a decision variable, whereas whether or not a person
develops lung cancer is a chance variable. We shall use
lowercase letters to denote single variables, and upper-
case letters to denote sets of variables. We call an as-
signment of state to every variable in set X an instance
of X . Typically, we refer to the possible states of a de-
cision variable as alternatives. We use a probability
distribution P{X |Y } to represent a decision maker’s
uncertainty about X , given that a set of chance and/or
decision variables Y is known or determined.
In this paper, we are interested in modeling relation-
ships in a domain consisting of chance variables U and
decision variables D. We use the influence diagram to
model these relationships. An influence diagram is (1)
a directed acyclic graph containing decision and chance
nodes corresponding to decision and chance variables,
and information and relevance arcs, representing what
is known at the time of a decision and probabilistic
dependence, respectively, (2) a set of probability dis-
tributions associated with each node, and optionally
(3) a set of utilities for all possible instances of U ∪D.
A belief network is an influence diagram containing
only chance nodes and relevance arcs.
An information arc is one that points to a decision
node. An information arc from chance or decision
node a to decision node d encodes the assertion that
variable a will be known when decision d is made. (We
shall use the same notation to refer to a variable and
its corresponding node in the diagram.)
A relevance arc is one that points to a chance
node. The absence of a relevance arc represents
conditional independence. To identify relevance
arcs, we ask the decision maker to order the vari-
ables in U = (x1, . . . , xn). Then, for each vari-
able xi, we ask the decision maker to identify a
set Pa(xi) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xi−1, D} that renders xi and
{x1, . . . , xi−1, D} \ Pa(xi) conditionally independent.
That is,
P{xi|x1, . . . , xi−1, D} = P{xi|Pa(xi)} (1)
For every variable a in Pa(xi), we place a relevance arc
from a to xi in the diagram. That is, the nodes Pa(xi)
are the parents of xi. All conditional independencies
implied by the given assertions can be read from the
graph using d-separation [Pearl, 1988].
Associated with each chance node xi in an influence di-
agram are the probability distributions P{xi|Pa(xi)}.
It follows that any influence diagram for U ∪ D
uniquely determines a joint probability distribution for
U given D. A deterministic node is a special kind of
chance node that is a deterministic function of its par-
ents. A minimal influence diagram is an influence di-
agram where Equation 1 would be violated if any arc
were removed.
Finally, an influence diagram may contain a single dis-
tinguished node, called a utility node that encodes the
decision maker’s utility for each instance of the node’s
parents.
Figure 1 contains an influence diagram for two lifestyle
decisions: whether or not to smoke and whether or
not to change diet. As is illustrated in the figure, we
use ovals, squares, and a diamond to represent chance,
decision, and utility nodes, respectively. There are
no information arcs in the diagram, although we can
imagine one between smoke and diet indicating the or-
der in which the decisions are made.1 The influence
diagram contains several missing relevance arcs. One
assertion made by the absence of these arcs is that lung
cancer and cardiovascular status are conditionally in-
dependent, given smoke, diet, and genotype. This as-
sumption and others in the diagram are questionable,
but they will serve for purposes of example.
When modeling decision problems, as decision ana-
lysts well know, it is important to clearly define all
variables. A good negative example of this is our de-
scription of variables in Figure 1. For example, what
does cardiovascular status really mean? Does the vari-
able refer to a patient’s mean blood pressure over a
period of a week, or to the amount of exercise that in-
duces chest pain? Does the variable refer to this status
one year from now or two? In order to facilitate the
1Decision order is not important for our discussion.
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Figure 1: An influence diagram for decisions about
lifestyles.
precise definition of variables, decisions analysts often
use a gedanken experiment known as the clarity test
[Howard, 1994, Chapter 7]. A variable is said to pass
a clarity test if a clairvoyant, who can see the past,
present, and future with certainty, can tell us which
state the variable is in.2 After applying the clarity test,
the decision maker may define cardiovascular status—
for example—to be the average diameter of her major
coronary arteries as determined by angiography one
year from the present.
3 Fixed Sets and Cause
In this paper, we take a practical view for our defi-
nition of causality. Rather than ask “what is causal-
ity?,” we ask “what do we use the notion of causality
for?” Answering the first question is extremely dif-
ficult. Philosophers have been arguing over the an-
swer for centuries. Answering the second question is
straightforward. When a chance variable x causes a
chance variable y, we know that any intervention that
results in the same state of x will lead to the same state
of y. Knowing this correspondence is useful for mod-
eling decision problems. If we know that x causes y,
then we know that if we represent the relationship be-
tween x and y, this relationship will remain unchanged
in the face of decisions that change only x directly. In
this paper, we take this useful property of causality to
be its definition.
To define causality, we must first formalize the more
primitive notion of a fixed set.
Definition 1 (Fixed Set) Given
uncertain variables U and decisions D, the fixed set
for U with respect to D, denoted F (D), is the set of
2The clairvoyant can only know the future conditioned
on the decisions to be made. We address this point in the
following section.
variables in U that take on the same states regardless
of the choice of D. The conditional fixed set for U
given C with respect to D, denoted F (D|C), is the set
of variables in U which take on the same instance for
any given instance of C, regardless of the choice of D.
In our lifestyles example, it is reasonable to assert that
genotype is in the fixed set for D = {smoke, diet},
because we expect that genotype will be the same
regardless of the decisions made. Also, we may as-
sert that length of life is in the conditional fixed set
F (D|cardiovascular status, lung cancer), because we
believe that length of life will be the same, once we
know cardiovascular status and lung cancer, regardless
of the decisions made. Note that, in this example and
in general, the order in which decisions D are made is
irrelevant to the identification of fixed sets.
Conditioning on C in the definition of conditional fixed
set is different from probabilistic conditioning. In par-
ticular, when we assess P{x|C}, we imagine that C
has been observed. When we assess F (D|C), however,
C may depend on D; and so C cannot be observed
prior to our choice for D. Instead, we imagine that we
have made decisions D and subsequently observe C.
We then identify the set of variables that take on the
same instance for any possible choice of D whenever
C takes on the same instance.
Membership in a conditional fixed set is closely re-
lated to conditional independence. Most important,
both concepts are subjective. The assertion that x is
in the fixed set F (D|C) belongs to a particular deci-
sion maker, just as does the assertion that x and D
and conditionally independent given C. In addition,
when x and D are conditionally independent given C,
then one’s belief in x does not change with changes
in D if C is known. When x is in the conditional
fixed set F (D|C), then x itself does not change with
changes in D once C is known. Thus, fixed set mem-
bership is stronger than is conditional independence:
If x ∈ F (D|C), then x and D are conditionally in-
dependent given C. We note that X ⊆ F (D|C) in-
terpreted as the I-statement I(D, C, X) satisfies the
graphoid axioms [Pearl, 1988] of decomposition, weak
union, and contraction, but not symmetry.
If a chance variable x is not in the fixed set with respect
to D, then—to some extent—it is under the control of
the decision maker. Consequently, neither the decision
maker nor the clairvoyant can observe x prior to the
decisions D being made. Conversely, if x is in the fixed
set with respect to D, then it is not under the control
of the decision maker and may be observed—at least
in principle. We call this observation the fundamental
property of fixed set observation.
Proposition 1 (Fixed Set Observation) Prior to
making a commitment to a set of decisions D, it is
impossible to observe those variables outside the fixed
set F (D), and we may observe those variables in that
fixed set.
We can now formalize our definition of cause.
Definition 2 (Cause) Given uncertain variables U
and decisions D, the variables C are causes for x ∈ U
with respect to D if C is a minimal subset of D ∪U \
{x} such that (1) x /∈ F (D), and (2) x ∈ F (D|C).
The second condition formalizes the notion that x
does not change with a set of decisions D, given a
set of chance variables C. The first condition guaran-
tees that the second condition is not satisfied trivially.
That is, the first condition guarantees that the deci-
sions D can affect x. The minimality condition pre-
vents some causes of C from being superfluous. Note
that, by our definition, causes may be decisions and/or
chance variables, but only chance variables may be
caused.
Variants of our lifestyles decision problem shown in
Figure 2 help us to illustrate the definition. Some
conclusions that can be drawn about each domain are
shown next to the influence diagram for that domain.
First, let us consider the decision problem in Figure 2a.
Here, we model only the decision of whether or not to
smoke; and we do not bother to model the variable
length of life. For this problem, it is reasonable to as-
sert that lung cancer is not in the fixed set F (smoke).
Also, it is true trivially that lung cancer is in the con-
ditional fixed set F (smoke|smoke). Consequently, by
our definition, we can conclude that {smoke} is a sin-
gleton cause for lung cancer. Similarly, we may con-
clude that {smoke} is a cause for smoking pleasure.
In addition, it is reasonable to assert that utility is
not in F (smoke), utility is in the conditional fixed set
F (smoke|smoking pleasure, lung cancer), and there
is no subset C of {smoking pleasure, lung cancer}
such that utility is in F (smoke|C). Therefore, we can
conclude that {smoking pleasure, lung cancer} are
causes for utility. As shown in the figure, we may
also conclude that {smoke} is a cause for utility. This
example illustrates an important property of our defi-
nition: causes are not unique.
Someday, it may be possible to use retroviral ther-
apy to alter one’s genetic makeup. Assuming that
a decision of whether or not to undergo such ther-
apy is available, it is reasonable to assert that geno-
type is not in the fixed set with respect to D =
{smoke, retroviral therapy}. In contrast, it is
reasonable to assert that genotype is in the condi-
tional fixed set F (D|retroviral therapy). Therefore,
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Figure 2: Variants the decision problem in Figure 1.
{retroviral therapy} is a singleton cause for geno-
type. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert that
lung cancer is not in F (D), that lung cancer is in
F (D|smoke, genotype), and that for no subset C of
{smoke, genotype} is lung cancer in F (D|C). Thus,
we can conclude that {smoke, genotype} are causes
for lung cancer. This example demonstrates that the
conclusions drawn about cause and effect, given our
definition, depend strongly on what decisions are avail-
able. Thus, as in our formal definition, we say that
{smoke, genotype} are causes for lung cancer with re-
spect to {smoke, retroviral therapy}.3
The influence diagram in Figure 2b corresponds to an
“alternative” view of the relationships between the de-
cision to smoke and lung cancer. Here, smoking is not
a cause for lung cancer. Rather, genotype is a cause
for lung cancer, and both genotype and smoking are
causes for smoking pleasure. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, these two views predict differently what
would happen should one start smoking. This exam-
ple emphasizes that our definition of cause and effect
is subjective. One person may hold beliefs correspond-
ing to the model in Figure 2a, whereas another person
may hold beliefs corresponding to the model in Fig-
ure 2b. Both people are “correct” provided they make
their decisions in a manner that is consistent with their
beliefs.
Our definition of causality is satisfying for several rea-
sons. One, it is consistent with a universally accepted
notion of causality: an effect cannot precede its cause.
In particular, we cannot observe a chance variable that
3To be brief, we often omit this last clause in our asser-
tions of causal dependence.
is caused by a decision before we make that decision.
Also, it satisfies the reasonable property that x and
y cannot cause each other, except for the special case
where x and y are related deterministically. Namely,
if {x} is a cause for y with respect to D and {y} is a
cause for x with respect to D, then one can show that
x must be a deterministic function of y and D (and y
must be a deterministic function of x and D).
We emphasize that our definition allows us to use
causality to model actions more than it explains the
fundamental notion of causality. We do not consider
this a practical weakness, because unless we can in-
tervene, recognition of causality has no benefit. For
example, if a variable is in the fixed set with respect
to our decisions, then there is no use in identifying
what we would otherwise perceive as its causes.
4 Graphical Representation of Cause:
Causal Influence Diagrams
Given the known benefits of the belief network for
representing conditional independence, we should ex-
pect that a graphical representation of cause and effect
would be useful. In the previous section, we saw that
our notion of cause and effect is intimately related to
the notion of the (conditional) fixed set. Thus, we de-
sire a graphical representation in which we can encode
the existence or lack thereof of fixed sets.
At first glance, the influence diagram appears to be
such a representation. In particular, consider the fol-
lowing graphical condition.4
Definition 3 (Block) Given an influence diagram
with decision nodes D and chance nodes U , C ⊆ U
is said to block D from x ∈ U if every directed path
from a node in D to x contains at least one node in
C.
If we reexamine our examples in Figure 2, we see that
whenever x is not blocked from D by the empty set—
that is, whenever there is a path from a decision node
to x—then x is not in the fixed set F (D). In addi-
tion, whenever x is blocked from D by C, then x is
in the fixed set F (D|C). Thus, in these examples, we
may read cause and effect directly from the influence
diagram.
In other examples, however, this correspondence be-
tween the graphical condition of blocking and fixed
sets breaks down. Consider the simple decision prob-
lem shown in Figure 3a. Here, we have the decision d
of whether or not to bet heads or tails on the outcome
4As is made clear in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2,
we do not need the full d-separation criterion.
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Figure 3: Influence diagrams for betting on a coin flip.
of a coin flip c. Whether or not we win is represented
by the variable w. Note that w is a deterministic func-
tion of d and c (indicated by the double oval). Suppose
we believe that the coin is fair—that is p(heads)=1/2.
In this case, if we do not bother to model the variable
c explicitly, as shown in Figure 3b, we need not place
an arc from d to w, because the probability of winning
will be 1/2, regardless of our choice d. Nonetheless, w
is not in the fixed set F (d), because w will take on dif-
ferent states for different bets. Consequently, we have
a situation where there is no path from d to w, and
yet w is not in the fixed set F (d).
Conversely, consider a subset of our lifestyles decision
problem shown in Figure 4a. If we choose not to model
the variable genotype, we can obtain the influence di-
agram shown in Figure 4b. In this influence diagram,
we cannot remove any arc without producing invalid
assertions of conditional independence. Nonetheless,
cardiovascular status is in the fixed set F (D|diet).
In order to discuss clearly the inadequacies of the in-
fluence diagram for the representation of fixed sets, we
introduce the following concepts, which closely parallel
Pearl’s concepts of I-map and D-map.
Definition 4 (F-map) An influence diagram is said
to be an F -map if
C blocks D from x =⇒ x ∈ F (D|C)
Definition 5 (F-map) An influence diagram is said
to be an F -map if
C does not block D from x =⇒ x /∈ F (D|C)
In our coin example, the influence diagram in Fig-
ure 3b is an F -map, but not an F -map. Conversely,
in our smoking example, the influence diagram in Fig-
ure 4b is an F -map, but not an F-map.
We can guarantee that an influence diagram is an F -
map by adding additional arcs to it. In the coin ex-
ample, having learned from the decision maker that w
is not in the fixed set with respect to d, we can add
an arc from d to w, making the diagram an F -map.
In general, however, we do not want to burden a deci-
sion maker with the task of guaranteeing that all fixed
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Figure 4: A subset of the lifestyles decision problem.
set assertions implied by the blocking condition are
valid. Fortunately, we can obtain such a guarantee,
by asking the decision maker to provide a set of local
assertions about fixed set membership. We call influ-
ence diagrams with these added local assertions causal
influence diagrams.
Definition 6 (Causal Influence Diagram) A
causal influence diagram is an influence diagram in
which every node x is in F (D|Pa(x)).
Theorem 1 All causal influence diagrams are F-
maps.
Proof: Suppose that a set of chance nodes C block D
from x, but that x is not in the conditional fixed set
F (D|C). Because the influence diagram is causal, it
follows that at least one of x’s parents—say—y would
not be in F (D|C). Applying this argument recursively,
until y ∈ C, we obtain a contradiction. 2
The situation is not as simple for F -maps. Let us
consider the following theorem.
Theorem 2 If an influence diagram is a D-map, then
it is an F-map.
Proof: If x ∈ F (D|C), then x and D are conditionally
independent given C. Because the influence diagram
is a D-map, it follows that C blocks D from x pro-
vided no head-to-head nodes or descendants of head-
to-head nodes that are downstream from decisions are
observed. If one such node—say—y were observed,
however, it would have to be in the fixed set F (D).
Therefore, y and D would be independent, contradict-
ing the fact that there is a directed path from D to y
and the influence diagram is a D-map. 2
Given Theorems 1 and 2, we have the following suffi-
cient conditions for representing cause and effect in an
influence diagram.
Theorem 3 Given a causal influence diagram that is
a D-map, C are causes for x with respect to decisions
D if (1) x is a descendant of some decision node in
D, and (2) C (which does not include x) is a minimal
set that blocks D from x.
Proof: Because the influence diagram is a D-map and
hence an F -map, condition 1 implies that x is not in
the fixed set F (D). Because the influence diagram is
causal and hence an F -map, condition 2 implies that
x is in the fixed set F (D|C). 2
It is reasonable to expect that decision makers will
be able to construct causal influence diagrams. Such
construction merely requires that the decision maker
provide a set of local assessments about fixed set mem-
bership. Unfortunately, an influence diagram may not
be a D-map. The decision problem in Figure 4b is one
such example. There is a special case, however, where
we can read causal relationships directly from an in-
fluence diagram. Following Verma and Pearl (1991),
let us consider a special type of decision, called a set
decision.
Definition 7 (Set Decision) Given an influence di-
agram for uncertain variables U and decisions D, a set
decision for x ∈ U with respect to D is any decision
node sx ∈ D such that (1) sx has alternatives “set x
to k” for each state k of x and “do nothing,” and (2)
x is the only child of sx.
Given a set decision sx, we can literally set x to any of
its states, or we can do nothing. When we set x to one
if its states, none of the other ancestors of x contribute
to the determination of x.
Theorem 4 Given a minimal causal influence dia-
gram for uncertain variables U and decisions D, and a
variable x ∈ U which has nonempty parents Pa(x), if
D includes a set decision for each chance-node parent
of x, then Pa(x) are causes for x.
Proof: Consider any node x. If x has no chance-node
parents, then x is caused by its decision parents. If
x has chance-node parents, then because the influence
diagram is minimal and there exist set decisions for
each such parent of x, x must not be in the fixed set
with respect to D. Furthermore, because the influence
diagram is minimal and causal, Pa(x), which includes
the decisions pointing to x, must be a minimal set C
such that x is in the conditional fixed set F (D|C).
Consequently, x is caused by its parents. 2
5 Howard Canonical Form and Causal
Mechanisms
Before making important decisions, decision analysts
investigate how useful it is to gather additional infor-
mation. This investigation is typically done by com-
puting the value of information about one or more
chance nodes in the domain. To compute the value
of information of observing a chance variable x with
respect to a decision d, one computes the decision
maker’s expected value given that x is observed be-
fore the decision d is made, and subtracts it from the
decision maker’s expected value given that x is not ob-
served before the decision is made. If the actual value
of learning something about x is less than the value
of information about x, we know that it is not worth
while to gather such information.
According to the fundamental property of fixed set ob-
servation (Proposition 1), it is not possible to observe a
variable outside the fixed set with respect to D. From
Theorem 2, this restriction translates to the restriction
that no chance variable downstream from a decision
may be observed before a decision is made, assum-
ing that the influence diagram is a D-map. This rule
can be stated in the following terms: If an influence
diagram is a D-map, then it cannot contain directed
cycles. In practice, this well-known rule is applied to
all influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1981].
Thus, in an influence diagram that is a D-map, we
cannot compute the value of information for any vari-
able x that is a descendant of a decision node. Fortu-
nately, with additional assessments, we can transform
a given influence diagram into one where we can com-
pute the value of information for any chance node.
Such a transformed influence diagram is said to be in
Howard Canonical Form [Howard, 1994, Chapter 7].
Definition 8 (Howard Canonical Form) An in-
fluence diagram is said to be in Howard Canonical
Form (HCF) if (1) it is a causal influence diagram,
and (2) every chance node that is a descendant of a
decision node is a deterministic node.
For example, consider the simple influence diagram in
Figure 5a. The corresponding influence diagram in
HCF is shown in Figure 5b. In this new influence dia-
gram, we have added the node c(s), which is a variable
that represents all possible deterministic mappings be-
tween smoke and lung cancer—that is, the variable
represents lung cancer as a function of smoke. The
possible states of this variable are shown in Table 1.
Also, by definition of c(s), lung cancer becomes a de-
terministic function of smoke and c(s). For example,
if smoke is yes and c(s) is in state 1, then lung cancer
will be yes. The uncertainty in the relationship be-
tween smoke and lung cancer, formerly represented in
the node lung cancer, now resides in the node c(s). In
effect, we have extracted the uncertainty in the causal
relationship between these two variables, and moved
this uncertainty to the node c(s).
Several points about the transformation to HCF are
c
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Figure 5: A transformation to Howard Canonical
Form.
Table 1: The four states of the mechanism c(s), which
relates smoking and lung cancer.
state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4
smoke no yes no yes no yes no yes
lung cancer no yes yes no no no yes yes
worthy of mention. First, condition 1 is important,
because it guarantees that the nodes we create are in
the fixed set with respect to decisions. If these new
nodes were not in the fixed set, then we could not
compute their value of information. Although Howard
does not use our language, he includes this condition
in his definition [Howard, 1994, Chapter 7].
Second, additional assessments typically are required
in order to transform an influence diagram into HCF.
For example, only one independent probability assess-
ment is needed to quantify the influence diagram in
Figure 5a, whereas three independent assessments are
required for the node c(s) in Figure 5b. We return to
this point later in this section.
Third, we can think of the c(s) as the causal mecha-
nism that relates smoking and lung cancer.5 Although
we may not be able to observe this mechanism, we
note that a clairvoyant always can. Consequently, this
mechanism passes the clarity test.
Finally, although we may not be able to observe c(s)
directly, we may be able to learn something about the
mechanism. For example, we can imagine a test that
measures the susceptibility of someone’s lung tissue
to lung cancer in the presence of tobacco smoke. The
probabilities on the outcomes of this test would depend
on c(s), and this test may be done prior to making the
decision smoke. Indeed, with the influence diagram
now in HCF, we can compute the value of information
of c(s) to investigate whether or not this test would be
cost effective.
Let us consider another example of a transformation
to HCF. In the influence diagram shown in Figure 6a,
the variable lung cancer depends on smoke and geno-
type. Therefore, we could extract the uncertainty in
5Pearl (1994) calls c(s) a disturbance.
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Figure 6: Another transformation to Howard Canoni-
cal Form.
this relationship by introducing a variable that repre-
sents lung cancer as a function of smoke and genotype.
The variable genotype, however, is already in the fixed
set with respect to decisions. Therefore, we need only
extract the uncertainty associated with the relation-
ship between smoke and lung cancer, introducing the
causal mechanism c(s). As in our previous example,
lung cancer is a deterministic function of smoke and
c(s). In contrast to our previous example, however,
c(s) depends on genotype. A similar transformation
can be performed on the variable cardiovascular sta-
tus and its parents, yielding the HCF influence dia-
gram shown in Figure 6b. In this influence diagram,
all chance variables are in the fixed set; and we may
compute their value of information.
To transform an arbitrary influence diagram into HCF,
we want to extract the uncertainty associated with
each variable into an associated causal mechanism. As
we have discussed, the causal mechanism for x need in-
clude only those parents of x that are not in the fixed
set with respect to decisions.
Definition 9 (Mechanism) Given a causal influ-
ence diagram with uncertain variables U and decisions
D, a mechanism for x ∈ U \ F (D) with respect to D
is a new variable x(Y ) which represents all possible
mappings from Y = Pa(x) \ F (D) to x.
If x is in the fixed set F (D), then we cannot recognize
a causal mechanism associated with x. If x is not in
the fixed set F (D), then a subset of the variables Y in
the definition (usually, Y itself) will be causes for x.
Also, by this definition, x will always be a determinis-
tic function of x(Y ) and Y .
Again, we emphasize that additional probability as-
sessments are required for the created nodes. If x
has r states and Y has q instances, then x(Y ) will
have rq states. Thus, in general, the assessment of
the probabilities associated with a causal mechanism
is formidable. In real-world domains, however, reason-
able assertions of independence often facilitate such
assessments. In some cases, no additional assessments
are necessary (see, e.g., Heckerman et al. 1994).
Theorem 5 (Howard Canonical Form) Any in-
fluence diagram for chance nodes U and decision nodes
D may be transformed into Howard Canonical Form as
follows:
1. If there is a node not in F (D) pointing to a node
in F (D), then reassess the influence diagram us-
ing a variable ordering for U where the nodes in
F (D) come first
2. Add enough arcs to make the influence diagram a
causal influence diagram
3. For every chance node x not in F (D),
• Add the mechanism node x(Y ) to the diagram
• Make x a deterministic function of Y ∪ x(Y )
• Make Pa(x) \ Y parents of x(Y )
4. Assess any additional dependencies among the
variables now in the fixed set F (D)
Proof: After steps 1 (and 2), no nodes in the fixed set
F (D) will be descendants of decision nodes. Therefore,
after step 3, all nodes that are descendants of decisions
will be deterministic nodes. Also, every mechanism
node added to the diagram will be in the new fixed
set F (D), by definition. Thus, all nodes downstream
from decisions will be (possibly indirect) deterministic
functions of elements of F (D) and D. Consequently,
every node x will be in F (D|Pa(x)); and hence the
influence diagram will be causal. 2
The need for step 4 in the construction is illustrated
by our example in Figure 6. If we had chosen not to
represent the variable genotype, we would have added
arcs—say—from smoke and lung cancer to cardiovas-
cular status, as in Figure 4b. The construction de-
scribed in the theorem, ignoring the last step, would
have created parentless mechanisms c(s) and v(s, c, d).
These variables, however, would be dependent and this
dependency would need to be assessed.
6 Counterfactual Reasoning
Causal models have been used to answer counterfac-
tual queries [Balke and Pearl, 1994]. A counterfactual
query is of the form: “if a were true, then what is the
probability that b would have been true, given that we
know c?” In our lifestyles decision problem, a counter-
factual query would be: “given that I have not smoked,
have maintained a good diet, have not gotten lung
cancer, and my cardiovascular status has been good,
what is the probability that I would have gotten lung
cancer had I smoked and eaten poorly?” As we dis-
cuss shortly, methods for counterfactual reasoning are
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Figure 7: The use of HCF to compute a counterfactual
query. The primed variables denote counterfactuals.
Shaded variables are instantiated.
important, because often they can be applied to real
decision problems.
Influence diagrams in HCF can also be used to an-
swer counterfactual queries. For example, to answer
our lung-cancer query, we begin with the influence di-
agram in HCF shown in Figure 6b. Then, we make two
copies of all variables not in the fixed set, as shown in
Figure 7. The first copy represents the actual state
of affairs; and the second copy represents the coun-
terfactuals (in our example, smoke = yes and diet =
poor). The variables in the fixed set are not copied,
because, by definition, they cannot be affected by de-
cisions. Also, by definition of mechanism, each copy of
an observable variable has the same deterministic re-
lationship with its mechanism. To answer our query,
we instantiate the decision and chance variables in the
first copy of the diagram to their observed values (no
smoking, good diet, no lung cancer, and good car-
diovascular status, in our example). In addition, we
instantiate our counterfactual decisions in the second
copy of the diagram. Then, we use a standard belief-
network inference method to compute the probability
of the variable(s) of interest (lung cancer in our exam-
ple).
Using this approach, we can answer arbitrary coun-
terfactual queries, including queries where variables in
the fixed set have been observed. For example, we can
answer the query, “given that I have not smoked, have
maintained a good diet, and have a genotype predis-
posing me to lung cancer, what is the probability that
I would have gotten lung cancer had I smoked.” The
approach is closely related to that described by Balke
and Pearl (1994).
Procedures for counterfactual reasoning often can be
used for real decision problems. For example, consider
a modification of our original counterfactual query:
“Given that I have not smoked and have maintained a
good diet over the last year, and have not gotten lung
cancer and have a good cardiovascular status, what
is the probability that I will get lung cancer one year
from now if I begin to smoke?” If we assume that
the relationships in the original domain model do not
change over the two-year time period in the query, then
we may use the influence diagram in Figure 7 to answer
this query. Heckerman et al. (1994) provide another
example in the domain of logic-circuit troubleshooting.
Also, see the discussion in Goldszmidt and Darwiche
(1994).
7 Global Causal Models
Most previous work on the graphical representation of
causality concerns the situation where all interactions
in a domain are causal (see, e.g., Pearl and Verma
1991, Druzdzel and Simon 1993, and Spirtes et al.
1993, and Pearl 1994). Here, we consider this special
case, and describe correspondences between our work
and the work of Pearl et al., which is representative of
this body of work.
When all interactions among variables in an influence
diagram are causal, we call that influence diagram a
causal network.
Definition 10 (Causal Network) An influence di-
agram with uncertain variables U and decisions D is
said to be a causal network for U with respect to D if
Pa(x) are causes for x with respect to D for all x ∈ U .
It follows immediately that every causal network is a
causal influence diagram.
An example of a causal network is the influence di-
agram in Figures 2b. (Of all the influence diagrams
presented in this paper, only this one is a causal net-
work.) As another example, we can transform the in-
fluence diagram of Figure 1 into a causal network by
adding the decision node retroviral therapy and an arc
from this node to genotype.
As in the local case, we cannot always identify causal
networks using our graphical blocking condition. From
Theorem 4, however, we can do so given enough set
decisions. In the following corollary, a node with at
least one parent but without any children is called a
leaf node.
Corollary 6 A minimal causal influence diagram for
uncertain variables U and decisions D such that D in-
cludes a set decision for each nonleaf uncertain vari-
able in U is a causal network.
Pearl et al. define a causal model (or causal network)
for a set of uncertain variables U to be a minimal be-
lief network such that every variable is caused by its
parents. They take cause and effect to be a primitive
notion, and do not define it. They assert that, given
a causal model for U , it is likely that there exists a
corresponding set decision for every variable in U .
Our approach is the reverse of theirs. We start with a
definition of causality in terms of decisions, and then
show that given set decisions for all nonleaf variables,
all interactions must be causal.
Another correspondence exists. Namely, if we trans-
form a causal network by our definition into HCF, we
obtain a model where every chance node is a determin-
istic function of its old parents and a single mechanism.
If we assume these mechanisms are independent, we
obtain Pearl et al.’s definition of a causal theory for U .
8 Future Work and Conclusions
An important aspect of causality that we have barely
touched upon in this paper is the notion of time. Al-
though many of the results presented here are applica-
ble to time-varying domains, where two different nodes
in an influence diagrammay represent the same system
variable at different points in time, there are aspects
of such domains that we have yet to explore.
We have presented a practical definition of cause and
effect in precise decision-analytic terms. We have
shown how the influence diagram is sometimes inad-
equate for the graphical representation of cause (by
our definition), and have shown how some inadequa-
cies can be eliminated. We hope that this work will
begin to knit the closely related threads of research in
decision analysis and causal modeling.
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